The Atlantic - Latest Comments in The War Inside The Civil War

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Beau47 — Sat, 06 Mar 2010 21:12:14 -0000

Dera TNC,

At one time, you had asked for some thoughts on books to read on the Civil War; I suspect that you have read these.

I just finished reading the 3 volumes of Bruce Catton's Trilogy of the American Civil War (The Coming Fury, Terrible Swift Sword, and Never Call Retreat), completed T. Harry Williams bio of PGT Beauregard, and begun Shelby Foote's 3 volume history of the Civil War. These two are the first comprehensive histories of the entire conflict I read since a two volume set in 1958, and I recommend them. Over many years, I read detailed descriptions of prominent and not so prominent individual battles and magazine sized bios of different personalities, by Catton and others, but nothing compares to his trilogy for me.

For the most part, investigating the causes and politics had been secondary to me until your blog kindled thoughts about them. For that I am grateful. On an intuitive level I understood the drivers of the war, but until touring the great antebellum plantations again near our New Orleans homeland, reading your blog and Catton's history, did the passion of the human struggle for freedom become so highlighted. So far, Foote's history disappoints because he doesn't seem to bring the human dimension as clear as Catton, and Foote doesn't explore as completely Lincoln's commitment to the abolition of slavery as the undergirder of his politics. Steele seems to tell the story more from the clash of armies rather than the clash of irreconciable views of justice and human rights.

More later.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Midland — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 16:00:13 -0000

Yes. But not Berlin. And the German-American population of the East Coast wasn't rounded up, even though u-boats were operating within sight of NYC. And most US propaganda didn't target Germans as a race . . . And no Americans sent their girlfriends German skulls as souvenirs.

The distinction here is between whether racism affected the behavior of Allied troops fighting the Japanese in World War II or was it the determining factor in how they were treated? The first statement is obviously true. The second is almost certainly not true. The Japanese set their own rules on treatment of prisoners and surrender. The Western Allies reacted, to some degree, by treating Japanese dead and wounded more callously than they did German and Italian dead.

And German troops who fell into US custody were sent to plow fields and get fat in Iowa.

Japanese troops who "fell into US custody" were treated similarly.

I'm not sure if we are on the same topic here because you keep trying to equate two radically different situations.

For the most part, German and Italian soldiers in World War II followed Western cultural conventions as regards surrender and capture. Surrendering was dangerous for them, but no more so than for soldiers of any other European country in that war. Millions of them surrendered and recieved reasonably decent treatment in prisoner of war camps.

Fanatical German troops in Sicily and Italy occasionally tried the "white flag" trick to lure American and British soldiers into the open to be captured or ambushed. Germans who did this had very little chance of surviving a surrender attempt afterward. Likewise, the Waffen SS and other fanatical German soldiers who were known to fight to the death or to abuse and murder prisoners had a good chance of being killed when captured.

The Japanese made fanatical resistance, abuse, and murder the standard practice for their entire army. For the most part, they would not surrender at all, and for this reason only a few thousand were received as prisoners. Once they were in American hands and away from the danger zone of the front line, Americans found them quite likable and chatty. They were good intelligence sources, as they hadn't been trained to handle even the most casual interrogation process.

African-American soldiers in the Civil War fought under the morally stressful position of American and Commonwealth soldiers fighting the most fanatical German soldiers in Europe in World War II. They knew the enemy did not take prisoners, or might murder them out of hand. Any other factors affecting their behavior tend to be blurred by this stress factor.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Carrington — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 14:36:47 -0000

Part of that was embarrassment at the treatment of German-Americans during the war to end all wars.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

burnstony — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 12:16:08 -0000

http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trt027.html

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

burnstony — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 12:14:08 -0000

If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong.

"I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I can not remember when I did not so think, and feel. And yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling." - Abraham Lincoln

I think these examples make that so clear - what the hell is a war crime if you believe in slavery

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

aleks — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 11:54:29 -0000

Yes. But not Berlin. And the German-American population of the East Coast wasn't rounded up, even though u-boats were operating within sight of NYC. And most US propaganda didn't target Germans as a race. And German troops who fell into US custody were sent to plow fields and get fat in Iowa. And no Americans sent their girlfriends German skulls as souvenirs.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Carrington — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 11:50:49 -0000

One thing to note, tactically -- 'no quarter' in the Pacific was a behavior with asymmetric result, specifically one that favored the Japanese. (Much as, it might be noted, it tended to favor the Soviets as they defended against German attack.)

As you mention, the Japanese soldier was indoctrinated to fight to the death... but American behavior toward the Japanese simply reinforced that indoctrination, helping the Japanese military maintain the discipline it had sought in the first place.

David Grossman's On Killing is of significant interest, by the way.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Carrington — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 11:42:37 -0000

There's a further point to be made in response, though your points are well taken. It's very easy to think of past history: "it happened that way, therefore it had to happen that way." Yet it is also dangerous, because we tend to draw general conclusions from a specific historical narrative.

It's often helpful to ask what might have been.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Carrington — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 11:23:59 -0000

:-)

"The locals" also wait for the walk-signal with nary a car in sight. In the middle of December.

In a way not surprising.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Carrington — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 11:17:52 -0000

Understood, although this is the reason I would term such a northern strategy a 'strategy of containment,' to be expected to act in slower motion, as a police stated dissolved itself.

The one problem with your argument, it should be noted: given northern liabilities, the call "On to Richmond" made no sense. Nail down the railroads, fortify the Potomac, hold the coastal forts, and build ships.

The strategic model, of course, is the Periclean strategy against Sparta. And, notably, Pericles, et. al. faced many of the same objections (and plague to boot). Nevertheless, the Athenians won... or at least until they deceived themselves that they could afford a small expedition to Sicily.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Carrington — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 11:07:28 -0000

In response to 433E83: political feasibility is a great question -- you're right, such a course was --probably -- politically unfeasable, especially without damaging the U.S. constitutional framework.

(though, nb. Maryland was under martial law in 1861 anyway: not a particularly good time for Md slaveowners to protest their 'dispossession.')

On the other hand, the question is interesting because the existence of a strategically optimal war policy (that wasn't taken) is very helpful in mapping out extant political restraints -- the historical equivalent of a radioactive trace for medical imaging.

And, finally, it illuminates the bounds of an ongoing civil-military debate: war is, to be sure, and extension of politics, but politicians must consider that a long or failed war tends to distort those politics as time goes on. I think it is a fair argument that such political distortions should be built into war planning simply because the distortions that occur ad hoc will, almost inevitably, be worse.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Midland — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 10:56:27 -0000

One of the creepier documents I've read from the Kansas-Missouri border war was a journal entry by either Frank or Jesse James. They were part of a group of raiders who ambushed a company of mounted Union militia. After killing most of them on the initial battle site, they tracked the survivors down and finished them all off, wounded, attempting to surrender, etc. Then the boys went home for a "nice Sunday dinner."

They had issues, Frank and Jesse did. Kept on fighting the war for years after the final surrender, robbing banks and trains. They made the mistake, in 1876, of leaving friendly territory to rob a bank way up in Northfield, Minnesota, because owned by a former Union civil war general. A lot of the townsmen were Union army veterans and a terrific gun battle erupted. Six of the eight gang members were shot down in town or hunted down trying to escape. The locals were disciplined enough to take prisoners and give them due process.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

mjnewt0n — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 10:39:24 -0000

I believe the white officers would be extra careful in this situation. Remember how dangerous it was to lead black troops in the war.

They were already in a very vulnerable situation because the secesh were ordered that white officers were to be treated the same as the "escaped slaves". That is, shot and buried in un-marked graves at the battle sites. A fear all soldiers had I believe.

I would guess that white officers would try to mitigate any bad behavior just so they and their troops would be seen and treated as enemy soldiers.

It seems they (at least the good officers) would try to do anything to accomplish this.

Being elsewhere on the field would be no excuse for the officer in charge. He is expected to control his men.

Of course this assumes that all officers were good ones. That assumption is poor. I would agree with you there had to be officers that looked the other way. I would hope they were in the minority.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

BD — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 10:34:35 -0000

I'm still troubled by it--at the end of the day, you're still talking about surrendering men at your mercy, not unlike a captured terrorist. The reason we condemn torture (even if there's no doubt as to guilt) is precisely because such a person is at our mercy. Killing a prisoner--even one who committed evil acts--in the heated aftermath of a battle may be understandable, but it's still worthy of condemnation.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

BD — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 10:10:24 -0000

Very true--it makes it all the more impressive when soldiers are able to maintain their discipline and professionalism in the midst of combat.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

bloodofpatriots — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 09:10:18 -0000

Yup, just like Dresden. The decision to firebomb Dresden was undertaken, consciously, as an act of revenge for the firebombing of Coventry by the Germans. So, by this framework, the Germans had violated the "accepted" rules of war by purposefully targeting an entire city for extermination, military and industrial and pure civilian targets alike. The Allies were outraged and picked out a German city to receive payback.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

brucds — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 00:49:43 -0000

And mine was that, using the metric you introduced, the rightwingnuts spewed a whole hell of a lot more against Obama than was ever spewed against Bush - leaving aside the question of who actually deserved a lot of it.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Midland — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 00:37:04 -0000

A little more coherency would help, here.

Regarding the issue of race in WW2, carpet bombing of civilian targets in Europe and Japan was accepted as an essential strategy.

"Carpet Bombing," the Wikipedia entry notwithstanding, is not correctly used to refer to the bombing of cities during World War II. The Germans and Japanese in the 1930s first came up with the concept of "Terror Bombing," which is the unannounced bombing civilian centers to demoralize the enemy and break down civil order. The Japanese practiced it in China, the Germans in Spain, Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The British retaliated with small strikes against German cities in the early part of World War II. However, their precision bombing campaign against military and industrial targets, which was the only means they had of hurting the Germans and supporting their allies, the Soviets, during the crisis years of 1941 and 1942, failed. They could only get past German air defenses at night, so they came up with what they called "Area Bombing," which was deliberately intended to "de-house" the inhabitants of large cities, cripple industrial production, and demoralize the population. In theory, since the Germans had warning systems, this wasn't exactly "Terror Bombing," but if you started a firestorm, it was pretty much the same thing.

"Carpet Bombing" or "Saturation Bombing" was the concentration of a lot of bombs in a small area--a square mile or so--to completely eradicate all military opposition. It was used in the Battle of Normandy, in areas that were, in theory, on the front lines and cleared of civilians, with mixed results.

In the post-war world, these concepts have been blurred, to the detriment of American's moral and political standing in the world. Carpet bombing around civilians kills people needlessly, brutalizes the people doing the bombing, and is most often politically stupid.

However, there is no doubt that the Japanese soldiers were treated far worse then German POW's.

Unclear here whether you are talking about Japanese POWs and German POWs, or Japanese soldiers surrendering and German soldiers surrendering. The Japanese soldier was indoctrinated to fight to the death and try to kill people attempting to take him prisoner. He was also taught that other nation's soldiers who surrendered were contemptible creatures who should be tortured, brutalized, or murdered as a way of showing his racial superiority. The two situations aren't really comparable. Taking a Japanese soldier or sailor prisoner required deliberate effort. It would be a breach of standard Allied discipline to kill or molest a helpless prisoner, but, given the different views of surrender held by the Germans and the Japanese, it shouldn't surprise anyone that petty brutality was more common among Allied solders in the Pacific theater.

As an addenda, the Waffen SS tended to brutalize or murder prisoners more than German regulars, and also were more likely to try to fight to the death and take someone with them. Consequently, they had a low survival rate when they did try to surrender to veteran Allied soldiers.

Ultimately, it all breaks down into a sickness. Carpet bombing civilian targets is fine, but a rifleman shooting a civilian on the ground is a crime. I think I have heard every rational for the differentiation.

I dunno that I'd call it a sickness, and not that many people were "bombed" during the Civil War, but I agree with the sentiment.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Glennn — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 00:35:20 -0000

I'm a little concerned about those who would hold the black soldiers blameless or find nothing to condemn. I think their behavior is to be condemned and so is that of Forrest at Fort Pillow, just as someone who kills in passion or emotional reaction should be convicted alongside a murderer in cold blood. It's just that the second should be punished more than the first.

The black soldiers had good reason to want to wreak furious vengeance. That is undeniable, but it is not a pass on morality. After they slaughtered, would a Confederate who just saw his brother gutted while begging to surrender have reason to wreak vengeance on every future black soldier? Where does it stop?

I think it stops when we consistently condemn those who substitute their own passion for vengeance for a rule of law, including the rules of the law of war. To claim that because in war people often act savagely means there should be no condemnation for acting savagely is the argument of those upset Lt. Calley was tried for My Lai.

How severe the condemnation should be, how great the punishment can be fitted to circumstances. But to refuse to condemn soldiers who massacre the helpless, or to sanction their actions, seems to be going in the wrong direction.

I appreciate TNC, your point the atrocities require context, and that there's no report on the Union side of a massacre like Fort Pillow. I also appreciate your point that brutality begets brutality. That may make the second brutality understandable. But it is still brutality.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

nomadimp — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 00:24:53 -0000

oh, I also think that the character of Holt is one of the most nuanced and human portrayals of a relationship between slave and master that I've seen in a civil war movie. How his friendship and loyalty with Clyde was quite real but at the same time it was totally different from the friendship he later formed with Jake as a free man.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Liza — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 00:17:17 -0000

Dresden?

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

nomadimp — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 00:17:10 -0000

Definitely, I think that Ride with the Devil actually did a decent job of showing how personal vendettas and allegiances really fueled the whole thing.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

Midland — Tue, 14 Jul 2009 23:51:24 -0000

To sum up what others have said . . . it wouldn't have worked.

The entire slave-holding south was organized, from the viewpoint of a slave, as a police state, complete with checkpoints, "papers," and the right of any official--or white of social rank--to be as arbitrary and brutal as he pleased if he sensed some suspicious action or gesture from people of color. The militia system was tied to the county and state police authorities, all prepared to react quickly to any slave escape or resistance, with large numbers of tough, hard-edged racists (whites, Amerindians, and few free blacks) all very well armed, and perfectly ready to shoot, whip, hang, decapitate, or burn any black who crossed them. Any hint of encouragement of slaves to revolt would have probably have resulted in massive witch-hunts and thousands of deaths before the slaves even got the word around.

Of course, this solution could never have been seriously considered at the time. The political solution didn't allow for it. McPherson goes over the topic of Northern motivation quickly, but I presume other contributors to this discussion can name more intense scholarly discourse on the subject. Briefly, however . . .

First, the Lost Cause theory had it absolutely backwards. There was no conspiracy of Northern aggression to free the slaves before the beginning of the secession crisis. Most Northerners came to loathe slavery during the 1850s, but the number willing to get killed doing something about it was fairly small. The willingness of the North to fight a war, per my professor at Northwestern, was tied to the culture of rabid Southern nationalism that was deliberately built up in the 1840s and 1850s to provide a political defense for slavery. They considered themselves the "Real Americans," constantly voiced their contempt for Northern “mudsills and dirty mechanics, and their bullying, bragging, and power-mongering in Washington antagonized millions of Northerners who felt no more personal urge to free Southern slaves then they did Russian serfs or Chinese peasants. When they became a visible threat to the unity and safety of the Federal union, Republicans started counting votes in the millions and a large share of northern Democrats were willing to be convinced to join the fighting.

Another element that isn’t emphasized enough, to my thinking, is the history of democratic governments since 1776. France had gone through a Revolution, a First Republic, the Terror, the First Empire, a restored monarchy, a constitutional monarchy, a Second Republic, and was now a Second Empire. Other democratic movements in Europe had fallen prey to reactionary elements or had been unable to defend themselves from foreign armies. Attempts to create large federal unions like the United States in Latin America had failed utterly, provinces seceding and governments collapsing into anarchy or dictatorship. Thus, Americans had every reason to expect nothing but catastrophe for the entire nation if they let a rebellion go unchecked any faction of states to separate itself from the union.

The original secession crisis involved only seven states. That left Lincoln to be the president of eight slave and nineteen free states. He had no navy or army to speak of, just a frontier constabulary and a couple of dozen ships capable of showing the flag around the shores of a rebellious “combination” with a coastline as extensive as that of northern Europe. He had no powers he could bring to bear to restore the union himself. All he could do, practically speaking, was put on a brave front of holding on to Federal property and hope enough states would see looming catastrophe of dissolution and back him up with volunteers if it came to a fight. When South Carolina started the shooting, he got his volunteers from New England and the Midwest, while four of the eight slave states joined the Confederacy. Lincoln had no idea how long he could count on support from the rest of the North and if he lost Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland the game was up. The Confederacy would get control of the national capital, along with all internal communications along the Ohio, the Mississippi, and the lower Missouri. The Northeast would be linked to the Midwest by two railroads and Lake Erie, Colorado and New Mexico would be out of reach and defenseless and California and Oregon would, for all practical purposes, be reachable only by sea.

Given that, any direct action by the Federal government to free the slaves anywhere would have been suicidal. Inciting slave revolts would have destroyed the Union in a matter of weeks.

It would be more than a year before Lincoln had enough military force on hand to protect his military frontiers and “wall off” the south by sea. By then, the south had mobilized a giant army of its own and clamped down even tighter on the slaves.

Union opinion, solidified by war, had evolved to the point that a majority of the soldiers and voters saw slavery, not just as an evil in itself, but the core of the secessionist philosophy that had caused the war and kept the South fighting. Lincoln thereby had enough political maneuvering room to free slaves held outside of union control. He did not expect them to revolt, which would have gotten them massacred to no good purpose, but he did expect them to take a chance on freedom whenever a Union army got close enough to breach the chains of the Southern police state. Several million of them did take that chance, ending any possibility of restoring slavery as it had been, regardless of how the war ended.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

adin — Tue, 14 Jul 2009 23:28:28 -0000

In the midst of battle it is very difficult not to shoot the man who was just trying to kill you. There is simply too much adrenaline, fear, and a rush of feelings that I can't describe, even though I have been in small unit, close quarters combat. There are some extraneous factors effecting the reaction, but, in my experience, they proved to be minimal. It is all too personal. Fear, rage, survival, and vengeance all coalesce

at the same time, I guess. A number of posters have mentioned this particular aspect of combat. The moment of surrender is very frightening and requires an unusual amount of self-discipline for the soldier who deals with the soldier surrendering. No one can predict, or learn that kind of control. More often than not, it is a split second decision driven by the immmediate environment, I think.

Regarding the issue of race in WW2, carpet bombing of civilian targets in Europe and Japan was accepted as an essential strategy. However, there is no doubt that the Japanese soldiers were treated far worse then German POW's. Ultimately, it all breaks down into a sickness. Carpet bombing civilian targets is fine, but a rifleman shooting a civilian on the ground is a crime. I think I have heard every rational for the differentiation. The folks who try to do that have their head so far up their ass, they can see their tongue wagging through the light between their yakking lips.

I think this is germane to the topic.

Re: The War Inside The Civil War

433E83 — Tue, 14 Jul 2009 22:38:58 -0000

Part of the Union garrison was a white TN cavalry unit. One of them survived and wrote that Forrest's troops were outraged having to fight "home-made Yankees" and wanted to teach them a lesson. Deeply personal on both sides.