The Atlantic - Latest Comments in The Big Thing

Re: The Big Thing

Brad L — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 11:39:51 -0000

If you only have the resources to investigate one fertilizer-buyer, you should investigate the muslim.

Well, as I said, we are breaking down at the point of "Muslim" being a particularly useful measure, and that the two same candidates with only that difference will likely represent different outcomes. Goldberg provides a very small anecdotal pool to justify this conclusion. I'm asking for more than that, something in the way of rigor.

I think he is complaining that the Army did nothing after Hasan's presentation on Jihad...

In terms of the army ignoring behavioral warning signs or, reverse-profiling: maybe that is what he thinks was happening, but a) that doesn't mount a case for profiling so much as better attention to actual behavioral warning signs and b) the facts simply don't seem to be bearing this out. The FBI was reading his emails; I have no particular knowledge of how he came to be monitored, but he clearly did.

If Goldberg's whole thesis really is akin to "don't rule out paying attention to warning signs b/c someone happens to be Muslim" then I am disappointed in him for writing something so trivial, and in myself for spending so much time trying to make sense of it.

Re: The Big Thing

The Ninja Zombie — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 11:06:53 -0000

Brad, all I'm saying is that racial profiling is useful in a world of limited resources. If you only have the resources to investigate one fertilizer-buyer, you should investigate the muslim. (Outside my contrived example, you obviously should look up tax returns and check for farm income before you do anything.)

As for Goldberg's specific comment, I think he is complaining that the Army did nothing after Hasan's presentation on Jihad. The implication (stated more explicitly by other writers, and implied by Goldber) is that the Army did *reverse* profiling -- because Hasan was a Muslim, they ignored warning signs to avoid appearing anti-Muslim.

Re: The Big Thing

Brad L — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 10:20:27 -0000

Reply fail. This was meant to the respond to NZ one comment up.

Re: The Big Thing

Brad L — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 10:19:26 -0000

I think this is a fair answer, but it isn't really what I thought Goldberg and others were alluding to -- I thought that the criticism was that there was some further action that we need to take. Goldberg's offered analogy (a poor one, I thought, for reasons well articulated by others downthread) was the denial of security clearances as a preventative measure. Maybe this is an unfair reading, but that is the risk that any writer takes without providing specifics.

(And to answer your specific question, I had never heard of Kuru, but I am guessing the next step after a correct diagnosis is palliative care?).

My "McVeigh-style fertilizer example" simply involved a person purchasing fertilizer - for all you know he simply has a large garden. Profiling is useful in deciding who to watch, but it's useless after you have surveillance results.

Supposing, though, that two farmers had both a) published violent anti-government (or anti-any-other-group) screeds and bought some trigger amount of fertilizer, I wouldn't really care which was Christian and which was Muslim. At the very least, someone could (rather easily) check into the size of their farm.

Behavioral warning flags are always going to be more useful than trait-based flags. I have doubts that you can draw the right circle (in practice, not theory -- I'm not denying the whole of Bayesian analysis) where the behaviors themselves alone don't warrant attention, but the behaviors plus "Muslim" works (or, for that matter, "current or former service member," which circumscribes every case that Goldberg mentions, plus McVeigh and John Allen Muhammed). And in this case specifically, there were clearly enough behavioral flags that prior profiling wasn't needed -- which makes it a poor platform for trying to make the point that we need more profiling (again, per inference from Goldberg).

But I'm happy to let this stand as a point of disagreement -- I'm not really in any position to prove otherwise; even if you are, the amount of statistical work it would take to demonstrate the assumption would be burdensome to produce (going beyond anecdotes, which is where Goldberg stopped). We're great pattern recognizers; so good that we recognize patterns that aren't there, including patterns we want or expect to see. This suggestion needs a little rigor to back it up, even apart from moral considerations.

Re: The Big Thing

alex1 — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 09:50:38 -0000

I think I have never seen such near unanimity on a comment thread. Great post, and spot on.

It's very telling that Goldberg, in promising to give us "the big thing," doesn't actually give us that much. He seems to back away from the logical consequence of his insinuation that Hasan killed fellow Americans because he was a muslim, which is that we should put all American muslims on trial.

But somehow I think that's the strategy. He makes a specious argument, refuses to draw the morally untenable conclusion, but secretly hopes that someone us will. That's why his cowadly retreat from the consequence of his own logic is so contemptible: it's like convincing another kid to steal candy and proclaiming innocence since you're not actually the one who did it.

Re: The Big Thing

The Ninja Zombie — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 08:32:18 -0000

Brad, I did answer your question. Watching is the useful step you take as a result of profiling. My "McVeigh-style fertilizer example" simply involved a person purchasing fertilizer - for all you know he simply has a large garden. Profiling is useful in deciding who to watch, but it's useless after you have surveillance results.

Think of it in the same way as medical profiling. Imagine a person walks into harlem hospital with trembling, headaches, lack of coordination and occasional giggling. Racial profiling: you give them a Kuru test if they are from New Guinea, don't bother otherwise. What is the useful step after the Kuru test?

Obviously, racial profiling is no longer useful. Just go with the test results.

(This probably would not have prevented Ft. Hood, but I never claimed it would. I'm only disputing the claim that racial profiling doesn't work. It does work if you do it right. )

Re: The Big Thing

Brad L — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 04:50:43 -0000

NZ,

you say ...you watch the muslim libertarian farmer but not the christian libertarian farmer. That's the practical measure you take.

But my question has always been this: what is the useful step after "watching"? Watching someone, as an end, will not always prevent them from doing something terrible (as this case shows - Hasan was, in fact, being watched, according to reports that his emails were evaluated by the FBI).

I can't ask this more plainly: what is the outcome of more watching (profiling or otherwise) supposed to be? What does the actual intervention look like, particularly in cases like this one (and unlike a McVeigh-style fertilizer example) where there isn't a specific "plot" to be foiled?

[As an aside -- I hope not to sound rude, but you keep answering questions I'm not asking; I never asked about the morality of profiling, nor about the validity of the probabilities suggested, though I admit doubts about both. I'm assuming, for argument, that someone generated "warning signs" (through profiling or otherwise), and am asking "now what?"

I'm asking the question because I think Goldberg is engaging in an unpleasant sort of Monday-morning quarterbacking. He's not actually suggesting what he would have done, how it would have prevented this particular tragedy, and whether it could be broadly applied. Instead, he just says that we erred, and will continue to err, through a vague process of "ignoring."]

Re: The Big Thing

Sweet Jones — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 01:39:46 -0000

But who gets to define who the 'white-supremacist white men' are and how accurate is it?

For you, that list might be limited to known members of 'racist' organizations (KKK, White Knights, Neo Nazis, etc.)

For others, that list could include everyone who got Ron Paul's newsletters to police officers with a history of giving out a disproportionate number of tickets to minorities.

Re: The Big Thing

The Ninja Zombie — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 23:51:33 -0000

Brad, think of the probabilities involved. An oversimplified model: 1 in 100,000,000 non-muslims is a terrorist, and 1 in 1,000,000 muslims is a terrorist. For this reason, it's a complete waste of time to assume any muslim is a terrorist absent other warning signs.

Warning signs: anti-government sentiments (increases terrorist odds by 100) and fertilizer purchases (also increase odds by 100). (I'm assuming everything is independent, and neglecting intersections. Keep it simple.)

If a non-muslim purchases fertilizer and expresses anti-government sentiments, their odds of being a terrorist are 1 in 10,000, vs 1 in 100 for a muslim who did the same.

If your surveilance rule is "observe anyone with better than 1 in 1,000 odds of being a terrorist", you watch the muslim libertarian farmer but not the christian libertarian farmer. That's the practical measure you take.

Re: The Big Thing

martin peretz dispenser — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 23:18:46 -0000

Of course white men were not automatically suspect after the McVeigh bombings.

However, white-supremacist white men were suspect, since McVeigh was motivated in large part by this belief system.

I think it's becoming increasingly clear that Hassan was motivated in large part by his belief system as well, and that it was not incidental to his derangement.

Re: The Big Thing

martin peretz dispenser — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 23:13:51 -0000

Maybe. Probably.

But importantly...you have to realize that his coworkers weren't likely saints either. Was such behavior grossly out of bounds compared to others? People lie about accomplishments all the time in order to get hired.

Re: The Big Thing

Seekonk — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 21:38:03 -0000

Inquiry into potential dual loyalty can be valid, particularly when public officials or employees are involved.

I was an observer of the ’94 elections in KwaZulu-Natal. It was clear that many Zulus were acting and voting based on the instructions of their ethnic superiors. Similarly, I was raised in a hierarchical religion that created interests and imposed obligations other than those of the democratic polity.

Fairness requires full disclosure of such potential conflicts.

Re: The Big Thing

Carrington — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 21:28:41 -0000

Actually, per Slate, military bases are essentially weapons-free zones weapons and ammo must be accounted for and returned -- notably, the folks who shot Hasan were civilian police.

I'm not sure how much of weapons restrictions on base are because the weapons themselves are Uncle Sam's property, how much it is an issue of order and discipline. I wouldn't be too surprised if things shifted toward the latter.

The interesting buzz is that Hasan bought his 5.7 pistol at a Texas gun show and carried it, concealed, past the gate.

Re: The Big Thing

Carrington — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 21:21:37 -0000

Of course it seems one significant problem with U.S. intelligence is that all of these permutations of loyalty themselves have to percolate through an elephantine bureaucracy.

Don Cheadle's _Traitor_ captured some of this mess fairly nicely -- though probably far too cinematically.

Re: The Big Thing

Carrington — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 21:16:24 -0000

"Which means that security clearances must discriminate against reasonable people who look like they might have dual loyalties."

...or they discriminate _for_ dual-loyaltied people who might be willing to take on a triple loyalty -- and here we really enter the wilderness of mirrors.

Re: The Big Thing

jeffrey — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 20:34:27 -0000

I would like to second brucds invocation of Lynch's interpretation.

I’m proud of the Obama Administration’s response thus far, which has not given into racial or religious prejudice and fearmongering. Fort Hood was tragic. Investigations will determine if he had terrorist connections, etc.

But there is another tragedy that can be averted: the impulse toward racial profiling, alienating Arabs and Muslims, and all the accompanying garbage to the “clash of civilizations” narrative. It would be so sad to fall back into that trap because of one individual's senseless act of violence.

Here's how I understand Goldberg's logic:

America has wrongly used racial profiling in the past to discriminate against ethnic groups. Therefore, we should commit that same wrong again, because political correctness endangers us. Plus, it’s the terrorist’s fault anyway that people who have similar background are then discriminated against.

Here’s Goldberg’s logic applied to another historical example: America put Japanese-Americans in internment camps during World War II. It was wrong. But, they were a threat. Anyway, it’s the Japanese’s fault: they shouldn’t have bombed Pearl Harbor in the first place.

Re: The Big Thing

Brad L — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 19:15:11 -0000

@NZ

Whoops - to be clear, since you explicitly said you were not personally advocating the position, I mean to address the original "something should be done" posturing of Goldberg.

Re: The Big Thing

Brad L — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 19:12:54 -0000

NZ,

My objection (here) was specifically not a normative one; I was asking for what the next step should be. After all, if profiling is to be effective, there must be some practical measure as the outcome. What should that measure be? Detention? Dismissal? Therapeutic intervention?

What would have helped in this case, and what can be expected to help generally, and, how is this conclusion reached?

To reach a normative conclusion, though: I think there is something pernicious about advocating for such an obviously controversial (and possibly antagonistic) approach, while only making the vaguest possible gestures about how or why this approach might be effective.

Re: The Big Thing

The Ninja Zombie — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 18:56:10 -0000

Brad, I didn't advocate profiling. I said it would be effective if the knowledge "is muslim" conveys information (however incomplete) about terrorism probabilities. I'm disputing an incorrect claim ("profiling is just plain a waste of time"), not making any normative arguments.

One can believe a policy is effective even if it is morally illegitimate. For instance, I oppose torture, though I think it is sometimes effective. (Statistically correct racial profiling is something I'm undecided on.)

Re: The Big Thing

Brad L — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 18:37:01 -0000

It also seems painfully unclear what the outcome of the profiling, as advocated by Goldberg and some commenters here (NZ, simeond) should be.

Goldberg uses terms like "take seriously," but this is pretty open-ended. He was obviously already being monitored in some fashion -- it looks like he was being watched without some other system of profiling in place.

But it doesn't sound like he did anything that rises near to the level of detainment/prosecution, and it does not seem likely to me that kicking him out of the military would have prevented tragedy. After all, he already felt as though he was being persecuted for being muslim; being cast out by the military and losing his livelihood at the same time does not seem like a recipe for greater psychological stability. Perhaps it would have (especially if it was his request), but it seems far from given.

Re: The Big Thing

Consumatopia — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 17:58:09 -0000

Yeah, I'm also finding it ridiculous that denial of security clearance is being compared to ineligibility for military service.

Spying is a game of deception and double agents. It's implicitly accepted by all sides that pretending to be loyal to one side while actually being loyal to another is just the way decent people play the game. Which means that security clearances must discriminate against reasonable people who look like they might have dual loyalties.

Military service is completely different. It's irredeemably evil to swear an oath to a military service and then turn on your comrades. No reasonable or decent person would do that, no matter what their loyalties were. To deny Muslims eligibility for military service would be to deny that Muslims could be reasonable or decent.

Re: The Big Thing

brucds — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 17:50:07 -0000

I'm disturbed by the Army's continuing reliance on Hasan in the wake of some of the allegations, but in assessing how to move forward, Marc Lynch makes some good points - i.e. that al Qaeda's goal is to create a sense of rupture between Islam and "the West" and what some on the right are calling for in response to the questions surrounding this tragedy, like seperation of Muslims from military service or arbitrary "screening" on the basis of nothing other than ethnicity and/or religion, are exactly the direction that al Qaeda wants us to move.

http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/09/al_qaedas_master_plan

Re: The Big Thing

Carrington — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 17:25:19 -0000

There is another point that has to be made -- there are two intelligence responses to the Pollard case.

One is to realize that the CIA is a colander, and lose the fiction that secure information is actually secure.

The second, more proactive response would still have been the opposite course of action from what Jeff suggests: rather than tightening security with respect to Israelis and people with contacts in Israel, we would be _recruiting_ folks who fit this profile precisely because these are the folks who could build a viable counterintelligence capability. This latter response, of course, was beyond our political or institutional capacity, but it is a useful hypothetical nonetheless.

The relevant issue, however, is that Jeff entirely misses a similar dynamic with respect to the Muslim world -- we're fighting a guerrilla war in Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent Pakistan and Iraq. We often complain about fighting such wars with one hand tied behind our back, but the reality is that purging Muslims from the military would be like fighting the war after poking out our own eyes.

Even within American society, the best 'tips' on potential Muslim terrorists are going to come from their co-religionists, but again, only if law-abiding citizens have not been convinced that the best policy is that of the old Irish song: "whatever you say, say nothing."

Re: The Big Thing

Brien Jackson — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 17:16:58 -0000

Your problem is that you're reading Jeffrey Goldberg and assuming there's some sort of good faith argument there.

Re: The Big Thing

bitchphd — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 17:16:20 -0000

The kind of argument Jeff's making is pretty easy to dismiss: in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, did we decide that "whites"--or even "white men" or "white male veterans" were, as a group, suspect? Obviously not.

The tough thing about the Hasan case is that the facts that seem to be accruing--he was unhappy, he struggled with feeling that his religious and military obligations were at odds, he did some things that in retrospect seem like warning signs--are very, very difficult to translate into reasonable action. The military doesn't want to discharge people because they're principled, or religious, or have qualms about war. Arguably, in fact, the military should take pains to *retain* people who have qualms about war: you *want* people who will (for example) stand up in the face of possible war crimes, who will try to avoid indiscriminate killing, who understand that what they and their fellows may have to do, or what they may have to *order* fellow soldiers to do, shouldn't be done lightly. Certainly the military doesn't want to "let" people go easily. And we have to be cautious about hindsight; there are plenty of studies showing that eyewitnesses will misremember what happened after a violent event. It's really hard to predict with any kind of accuracy who is going to do something like this. The best we can do is figure out what kinds of things make it more likely, and even then I suspect it's difficult to tell the difference between, say, a depressed, unhappy, troubled person who is a suicide risk and a depressed, unhappy, troubled person who is at risk of going postal. (Personally I would guess that one difference might be that the postal person is more likely to express angry, anti-social hostility, but I'm probably wrong about that and it's only a guess.)

And in this particular case, given that the shooter was himself a military officer (albeit one who probably didn't tend to handle firearms in the course of his duty), there's the added problem of it being exceedingly difficult to deny him the means of committing a crime like this. We can hardly declare military bases weapons-free zones, as we can schools.

In any case, Hasan isn't the first military man to turn against his fellows. It happens on the battlefield occasionally. Domestic violence is a huge problem in the military. Rape is a huge problem. McVeigh, who I mentioned above, was a veteran. Probably it is a simple fact that military training, especially battle experience, disproportionately appeals to those with a propensity for violence and may create one in those who didn't have it before. It definitely gives people knowledge about how to be more *effectively* violent.

In short, I don't think this kind of thing is avoidable.